Down 14-0 at the start of the second half to the New York Giants,
the Houston Texans faced a 4th-and-1 on their own 46-yard line. At this point, with just a 9.0% chance to win, Bill O'Brien made the correct call to go for it. A successful conversion means a 12.9% win probability, while a punt means about an 8.6% chance to win. The break-even point going for it is far below an estimated 65% conversion rate on 4th-and-1. Alfred Blue ran off right tackle and was stuffed, turning the ball over on downs. The Giants would kick a field goal to go up 17-0.
On the very next drive, Ryan Fitzpatrick led the Texans downfield to the Giants 9-yard line where they faced another 4th-and-1. With 6:13 left in the third, down 17, Bill O'Brien elected to take the chip-shot field goal. Even the commentators suggested he should be going for it. Obviously, the prior failure on fourth down should not have an affect on the Texans' decision this time. If that were the case, O'Brien would be judging his previous decision on the outcome, rather than the process. The only other logic could be that he figured they would need a field goal at some point, down 17 - common faulty logic in the NFL as coaches should be doing whatever they can to maximize their chances of winning.
Texans Try Once, Fail Twice
Eagles Escape Embarrassment
Let my bias not be unknown, I am an Eagles fan. Watching Nick Foles fumble twice, throw an interception, and Chad Henne connect with rookie Allen Hurns twice for touchdowns -- all in the first half -- was one of the more frustrating ways to start the season. The Eagles were lucky to only be down 17-0 at halftime. On the opening drive of the second half, Philly converted twice and Nick Foles connected with Darren Sproles for eight yards on 3rd-and-9, bringing up a 4th-and-1 at the Jaguars 49-yard line.
Chip Kelly is known for his progressive thinking and he didn't hesitate -- calling for a hurry-up, one of the first times the Eagles really played up-tempo in the game. The Jaguars safeties got crossed and a huge gap opened up as Darren Sproles ran untouched for a 49-yard score. The Eagles would not look back and ultimately went on to win "handily," 34-17. Had the Eagles not converted, though, Kelly would likely have been ridiculed for his call as it could have effectively ended the game (dropping Philly's win probability to 5.4%).
Let's look at the fourth down call, taking into consideration the relative strength of the two teams.
Chargers Courageous Call & Playoff-Clinching Drive
Despite the controversy surrounding an illegal defense on the Chiefs' missed field goal at the end of regulation, the San Diego Chargers defied odds and clinched a postseason berth on Sunday. In overtime, Philip Rivers orchestrated a 17-play, nine-and-a-half minute field goal drive to start the extra quarter that ultimately sealed their win. The length of the drive, in this case, is just as important as the outcome as San Diego could advance with either a win or a tie.
Using our Markov model, let's take a look at the drive. Keep in mind, the model is best used for a standard drive when time and score differential would not greatly affect decision-making or play-calling. Since this was the opening drive of overtime, those standards will predominantly hold true, although not perfectly given the leverage of the situation.
Four Fourth Quarter Fourth Down Decisions
With a loss to the Redskins on Sunday, the Dallas Cowboys would leave themselves vulnerable to being eliminated from the playoffs by an Eagles win on Sunday Night. Heading into the fourth quarter, Tony Romo and company trailed 23-14. Starting from their own 20-yard line, the Cowboys drove to the Washington 35 before facing a 4th-and-1.
Fourth Down #1:
4th-and-1 converts around 70% and results in 22% win probability on a success and 7% win probability on a failure. E[WP] = 18%
In 2013, a 52-53 yard field goal converts about 62% and results in 17% win probability on a success and 6% win probability on a failure. E[WP] = 13%
E[WP] for a punt is a mere 9%.
Jason Garrett decided to go for it, this was the right decision. Unfortunately, Doug Free moved early forcing a 4th-and-6.
Is the Revolution Over? Did We Win?
"The Revolution Was Televised. The fourth down revolution is over. Going for it won."
Is Mike right? Did going for it really win? Mike makes a the case, and cites several promising examples of unconventional 4th down decisions from one Sunday afternoon earlier this season:
"-The Lions going for it on 4th-and-goal from the two-yard line, early in their win over the Cowboys.
-The Dolphins going for it on 4th-and-1 from the Patriots' 38-yard line, in the second quarter.
-The Patriots going for it on 4th-and-4 from the Dolphins' 34-yard line, while leading by three points in the fourth quarter.
-The Bengals going for it on 4th-and-inches from the 1-yard line, while leading 14-0 against the Jets.
-The Broncos scoring a 4th-and-goal touchdown to tie the game at 21 against the Redskins, in the third quarter.
-The Packers converting a 4th-and-3 from their own 42-yard line, setting up a touchdown to increase their lead to 31-17."
I think Mike is right to point out some very interesting cases where coaches are making some notable decisions, but the revolution is far from complete. I would suggest that an avalanche is the better analogy than revolution. One day there may be an avalanche of aggressive 4th down decisions, but right now we're only seeing a few rocks trickle down the mountainside. It's not that there haven't been bold examples of enlightenment. It's just that there are so many opportunities that coaches have spurned.
Lions' Odd Fake Field Goal
After stopping a Detroit Lions' fake field goal attempt, down 23-27, the Pittsburgh Steelers went on to score two unanswered touchdowns - clearly a product of momentum - and win the game 37-27. When the Lions faked the field goal, I was a little bit baffled. Normally, inside the 10 or so it makes sense to go for it because even with a failure, opposing offenses are pinned so deep in their own territory - depending on distance-to-go. 4th-and-5, with vertical space restricted at the 10-yard line, is not an easy conversion; it converts league-wide around 36%. Based purely on efficiency (not including time remaining or score differential), a field goal results in greater return (+0.16 EP over going for it). It's not a huge difference, as the break even point is only 39% conversion probability.
Frazier's Fourth Down Decision & Walsh Misses Wide
As 8.5 point underdogs, the Vikings managed to not only stay in the game with the Cowboys, but hold a lead with the ball nearing the end of regulation. Up 23-20, Christian Ponder faced a 4th-and-5 from the Cowboys 36-yard line with 3:04 remaining. While we are almost always a proponent of going for it in no-man's land, this presents an interesting decision point. Dallas had two timeouts remaining and with a conversion, Minnesota would be able to milk a good portion of the clock. With a made field goal from Blair Walsh - one of the top kickers in the league, despite his earlier missed extra point - the Vikings win probability actually falls to 75%. We have talked about this previously, being down six is sometimes better than being down three.
Jets 'Push' Their Luck
After forcing overtime, the Jets stopped the Patriots on their first drive, reverting to the old OT format - sudden death. Geno Smith and the Jets moved downfield before being stopped for a 4th-and-7 from the New England 38. Rex Ryan had three viable options here, keeping in mind that the next score wins: Kick a low-probability (40% league-wide) 55-yard field goal, attempt to convert a low-probability (42% league-wide) 4th-and-7, or punt the ball deep and risk Tom Brady leading a game-winning drive.
The Jets elected to attempt the field goal. Nick Folk missed wide left, but in a crazy turn of events, New England was penalized 15-yards for an unsportsmanlike conduct "pushing" penalty. Before we get to the penalty, let's talk about the decision. While I almost always advocate going for it in no-man's land, in this situation, I was leaning toward the punt.
For this analysis, I used a combination of my Markov probabilities as well as Brian's overtime win probabilities.
Bengals Punt Away Regulation
What Are You Doing, Chip?
Cards on the table, I'm a huge Eagles fan. As an NFL stats nerd, I could not have been more excited for Chip Kelly to make the transition to the big leagues. While I did not expect him to immediately institute his Oregon trademarks, I did expect to see him going for it more often on fourth down, especially in situations where the numbers called for it -- and generally, making decisions to maximize the Eagles win probability.
It's four weeks into the season, and too many times I've asked my TV, "What are you doing, Chip?" Today against the Broncos, there were a couple of questionable decisions. Down 14-3, the Eagles were moving the ball very well to start the game. Vick and company strung together a 15-play drive that ended up with a 4th-and-4 from the Broncos 7-yard line. Using our Markov model, we can look at the progression of the drive:
Same Decision, Different Results
Within about thirty seconds of real time, both two NFC North teams were faced with the same dilemma: 4th-and-1 in "field goal range," up three points with four minutes left in the game.
1. Detroit Lions: The Lions faced off against the Redskins on Sunday and went for it from the 12-yard line. Matt Stafford kept it and went up the middle, gaining two yards and converting. The decision here is pretty straight forward from a numbers perspective - especially on a 4th-and-1 - but so many coaches make the wrong choice.
Jason Garrett Should Have Punted
by Matt Meiselman
Matt has been helped me crunch some numbers this off-season. He is graduate of the University of Maryland with a degree in broadcast journalism. He's originally from New Jersey, but loves New York sports. Matt aspires to work in sports media and has a passion for sports statistics.
We're trying hard not to be broken records on 4th down decisions, but this one is special. -BB
Jason Garrett is not typically regarded as a savvy 4th down decision maker, and his clock management skills aren’t the greatest either. Garrett consistently makes blunders in way too many of his strategic decisions. But even after all the mistakes he’s made as the Cowboys head coach, he somehow found a way to top every one of them with a single mistake in Week 2 against the Chiefs.
With 3:50 to play in the 4th quarter, Dallas trailed Kansas City 17-13. It was the Cowboys’ ball, but they faced a 4th and 10 from the Chiefs 35. They held all three of their timeouts and undoubtedly still had a decent opportunity to come away with a win. Garrett had a decision to make: should he go for it? Punt? Or a kick a field goal?
Based on the 4th down calculator, the Cowboys chose the worst of the three options, and it wasn’t even close.
Bucs Botch Fourth Down Call
With 1:10 remaining in the fourth quarter, Tampa Bay led 14-13 on the Saints' 29-yard line. Facing a 4th-and-3, with an 82% chance to win the game, Greg Schiano elected to attempt the 46-yard field goal - about a 64% proposition. If the Bucs hit the field goal, they go up four points, increasing their win probability to 86%. With a miss, the win probability drops to 74% and Drew Brees gets the ball on the 36, needing only a field goal to win.
Saints Slip Up, Still Win
Sean Payton is back in the decision-maker chair for the Saints after his one-year sabbatical, and he is typically known as one of the more analytical coaches. The Saints pass more often than other teams, they go for it on fourth down more often, and even try the occasional surprise onside kick.
On Sunday, Payton faced a couple of fourth down decisions, testing his analytical mind. On their second drive, the Saints ran the ball on 4th-and-1 from their own 47-yard line -- a sizable gamble to the traditional football mind. Mark Ingram was stuffed and the Falcons would turn good starting field position into a field goal. This was definitely the right decision, despite the outcome (+0.84 EP going for it vs -0.30 EP with a punt).
The much bigger decision, though, came with 3:30 left in the game up three. The Saints faced a 4th-and-2 from the 4-yard line after a 5-yard completion to Lance Moore. Drew Brees lined up to attempt a 4th-down conversion but Payton ultimately decided to take a timeout to think things over. After the timeout, the Saints came out in field goal formation, made the chip shot and went up 23-17.
So, what do the numbers say?
Win Probability Forfeited 2012
by Matt Meiselman
Matt has been helping me crunch some 4th down numbers this off-season. He is a senior at the University of Maryland studying broadcast journalism. He's originally from New Jersey, but loves New York sports. Matt aspires to work in sports media and has a passion for sports statistics. -BB
In last year's article on this subject, Brian talked about how coaches aren’t just saving wins if they’re more aggressive; they are simultaneously forfeiting wins by being too meek. In 2011, the average team forfeited .65 wins for the year on 4th down decisions alone. The NFL has started to become more risk-friendly instead of risk-averse, and you’d expect that with more innovative minds in the game, like Bill Belicheck and Jim Harbaugh, the league would be trending towards more optimum game management. This was not the case in 2012.
During the 2012 season, the average team forfeited .73 wins, a significant increase from the year before. The average win probability forfeited per opportunity also rose, jumping from 1.6% of a win to 1.9% of a win. Below are the calculations for each team:
Patriots Primarily Punt on Fourth Down
Bill Belichick is known for being one of the greatest football minds in NFL history. He's also known for being one of the "riskiest" play-callers -- riskiest in quotes to emphasize that he actually plays to the odds rather than most of the conservative football minds. Down 28-13 in the AFC Championship game, avid Patriots fan Bill Simmons put it best: "Ravens playing to win, Pats playing not to lose."
Belichick faced eight fourth downs in the game against the Ravens, seven of which were legitimate questions for the best course of action: Go for it, punt or kick the field goal. Whereas we would normally expect Belichick to be aggressive, he seemed more reserved in his decision-making. There are a ton of factors that could explain his passive play-calling. For example, it was extremely windy making field goals more difficult and maybe Belichick did not have faith that Joe Flacco could sustain a 90-yard drive due to the Ravens boom-or-bust offense (the Ravens ended up with three scoring drives of 10+ plays including a 90-yarder and 87-yarder).
Let's look at each fourth down decision, starting with the very first. Remember in the beginning of the game, especially if the score is fairly close, we should look at expected points, but as score and time become bigger factors, we will switch to win probability. Also, note that these are league baselines. The fact that the Patriots offense is No. 1 in the league and far above league average would indicate a higher success rate on 4th-down conversion attempts.
The Seahawks' 4th and 1
I keep reading and hearing about how the failed 4th down attempt 'came back to bite Seattle' or that the decision cost 3 points in a game decided by 2. First of all, that's complete outcome bias. Expunge that kind of thinking from your head. Had SEA converted, the same people who are now critical would be praising Carroll for his courage. Second, you can't simply append 3 extra points onto the final score and say that would have changed the outcome. You never know how the game may have unfolded had Carroll decided on the FG attempt. Both teams would have played at different risk levels and at different paces had the score been different, particularly in the endgame.
I've refrained from the cookie-cutter 'should have gone for it, coach' posts this season for fear of becoming a one-trick pony. (Especially now that everyone can do the same thing himself with the 4th Down Calculator.) But this was a critical call in an important game, so I'll indulge. Here are the numbers on the 4th down itself. Remember, results are based on league average baseline numbers. It was 4th and 1 on the ATL 11 with 5:38 in the 2nd qtr. ATL was up 13-0.
New Overtime 4th Down Decisions When Down 3 Points
Your opponent kicked a FG on the first possession of overtime, and now your team needs a TD to win or a FG to continue the game. Your offense has driven down to the opponent's 10-yard line, but the drive has stalled. It's 4th down and 3. Should you go for the risky conversion and ultimately a TD for the win, or should you attempt a FG knowing you'd be at a disadvantage giving the ball to the opponent in sudden death?
The new NFL OT rules are unique in a lot of ways, and by unique I mean convoluted and contrived. There are basically three possible game states:
1. The first drive in which no score leads to Sudden Death, a TD wins, or a FG spawns the second state...
2. A possible second possession in which the offense is down by 3 points. It must score a TD to win or a FG to continue into SD.
3. Lastly, traditional SD itself.
The three game states successively easier to model. The first possession must consider all the possibilities of the following two states. The second state must only consider itself and the possibility of SD. The second possession is also slightly easier to model because there is no punt option. An offense trailing by 3 points simply must score or lose.
Cowboys Kick (Twice), But Still Win
In one of the more intriguing match-ups of the weekend, Tony Romo and the Cowboys received the ball in a tie game just over midfield with 0:47 seconds remaining. After two incompletions and one pass to Jason Witten, the Cowboys faced a 4th-and-4 at the Steelers 43-yard line. With 0:32 seconds to go and one timeout left, the Cowboys trot out their field goal team for a miraculous 60-yard game-winning kick. Both teams would call timeout and Jason Garrett would ultimately decide to punt instead, essentially assuring overtime. Let's think about this decision generally before looking at the frequency specifics.
If you punt, you are conceding to play overtime, giving your team a 50/50 shot to win the game. If you kick a field goal from that range, the probability that it goes in is at best the same as the probability that you miss and your opponent can score before the end of regulation, giving you a 50/50 chance to win optimistically. If you go for it and convert, you will have a much higher probability of making the field goal even with time constraints -- if you fail, you are pretty much in the same situation as a missed field goal.
Fourth Downs in the New Overtime: First Possession
1. The initial drive of the first possession (A TD wins, a turnover or punt triggers Sudden Death (SD), and a FG triggers State 2.)
2. The team down by 3 now has one possession to match the FG (triggering SD) or score a TD to win.
3. Sudden Death
The possibilities are illustrated in the event tree below, along with some back-of-the-napkin transition probabilities I made back when the new rules were first proposed. (State 1 is "1st Poss". State 2 is the branch under "2nd Poss" that follows a FG in the 1st Poss. Sudden death is self-explanatory and occurs after a no-score in the 1st Poss or after a FG is matched in the 2nd Poss.)
Panthers Punt Away The Win
On Saturday, I watched as my Northwestern Wildcats punted on 4th-and-1 from midfield, up three with 1:30 remaining. A conversion would have guaranteed a win, allowing the Cats to kneel down. By punting to Michigan State, I was certain NU would lose in dramatic fashion once again. Luckily, the Cats defense came up big, making what seemed like their first fourth-quarter stand of the year. Ron Rivera had an eerily similar decision against the Bucs this week.
With just over a minute left, the Panthers had the ball at the Tampa Bay 49, up 21-13. The Bucs had used all three of their timeouts, so a conversion wins the game. Not only do the Panthers have one of the best goal line backs in the league in Cam Newton, but they also have the human bowling ball, Mike Tolbert, who was born and bred for those situations.
To Fake or Not To Fake: Fourth Down Decisions
After we wrote about Mike Tomlin's fake field goal decision in Week 9, it got me thinking about the general success rate of fakes versus typical fourth down attempts. Before moving forward, it should be noted that it is difficult to pull fake field goal and fake punts out of play-by-play data because they are not explicitly specified as such. So, you may be getting an aborted or bad snap or the field goal/punt formation may not have been recorded. We attempted to clean the data up as much as possible, which resulted in 213 fourth down fakes since 2000.Similarly, we looked at the roughly 5500 fourth down normal go-for-it attempts. Granted, a lot of these will take place at the end of the game when teams are down by significant margins or must go for it in order to stay in the game, but that should not greatly affect their conversion rates. It may give us a sample bias, though, because those teams that are losing are typically worse offensively.
Fake attempts are exceedingly rare and given that there are only 200 or so attempts, we must be cautious of sample size issues. The most frequent fake attempts are on 4th-and-1 or 4th-and-2 which have happened about 30 times a piece. Compare that to over 2000 regular go-for-it attempts on 4th-and-1 and over 600 regular attempts on 4th-and-2.
Four 4th Down Decisions: Steelers Go Strictly on Feel
Big Ben and Eli Manning faced off against each other Sunday, leading the teams that have won four of the last seven Super Bowls; Manning and Roethlisberger will always be linked as the No. 1 and No. 3 QBs taken in the 2004 NFL draft. Let's look at the plethora of interesting decisions between the coaches.
What first tickled my fancy was when the CBS announcer mentioned that, "Mike Tomlin says he makes all these decisions strictly on feel." This was before the Steelers went for it on 4th-and-1 from the Giants 48-yard line, down 7 in the second quarter. After I shuddered at the quote, I checked out the 4th-down calculator to confirm my notion that this was one of the easier football decisions to be made:
First Falcons Drive & Botched Bears Field Goal
Andy Reid had never lost coming off a bye week in his head-coaching career. Matt Ryan did not care. Leading the Falcons on a 8 minute 44 second opening drive, Ryan and company marched 80 yards down the field over 18 plays before hitting Drew Davis on a 15-yard touchdown. Up 7-0, the Falcons were 72% favorites to win the game and that probability would never dip below that the rest of the day.
Here is a quick look at Matty Ice's first drive -- on which he went 6 for 7 for 62 yards -- using our Markov model:
A Week of Weak Decisions
There were a plethora of interesting coaching decisions this week, especially in the early games on Sunday. Avid readers cringe at these conservative calls so let's look at a few of them a little closer.
Cleveland Browns: Punted on 4th-and-1 on the Indy 41-yard line down by four with a little over six minutes remaining.
On what was likely the worst decision of the day, the Browns cut their expected win probability almost in half by punting. On 4th-and-1 from the opponent's 41, you should almost always go for it. You are expected to score +1.58 points by going for it (74% league-wide conversion rate) versus -0.04 points by punting.
Cardinals Don't Believe Closer is Better
With three minutes left in the game, the Cardinals got the ball on their own 15-yard line, down 16-13 to the Bills. John Skelton, in for the injured Kevin Kolb after the fourth play of the drive, leads the offense to the Buffalo 43-yard line where they stall on three straight incomplete passes. So, it's 4th-and-10 with 1:14 remaining, do you attempt the 61-yard field goal for the tie, or try to convert the 4th-and-long?
Groupthink in the NFL says attempt the field goal, but as those avid readers will certainly know, groupthink is often far too conservative. Here is the breakdown, via Brian's 4th-down calculator:
Reid's "Gutsy" Call Goes Unnoticed
Down six to the Steelers on the road, Michael Vick and the Eagles took the field near the start of the fourth quarter. After three short gains, the Eagles faced a 4th-and-1 from their own 30-yard line. In today's NFL, this is an easy decision for coaches: Teams punt the ball over 90% of the time. Since there was still significant time remaining in a one score game, it's safe to assume that the Eagles should have performed similarly to a score and time-agnostic situation (although obviously it had some factor in Reid's decision).
Reid was feeling some extra confidence from his tufty moustache, so he decided to go for it. I mentioned it was an easy decision for coaches to punt, but is it the right decision?
Saints Shocked: 4th Down Decision
RGIII was the only rookie quarterback to win on Sunday, when his Redskins took down the Saints 40-32. Brees was pressured heavily all game and while it's extremely difficult to quantify the value of coaching, people are wondering what kind of effect the loss of Sean Payton will mean.
One immediate impact is strategic decision-making. Sean Payton is known for his risky decisions. And by that, I mean he is known for those decisions that are publicly perceived as "risky," even if they are the statistically correct decision. Last year, the Saints were the No. 8 team in terms of win probability forfeited on 4th down (meaning they were in the top quarter of the league in 4th-down decision-making). So, what did we learn on Sunday?
With just about 2:00 to play in the 3rd quarter, down 30-14 already, the Saints were faced with a 4th-and-goal from the 3-yard line. Below you can see the results from the 4th-Down Calculator:
WP Forfeited
One thing I've learned about human nature is that to help convince someone of something, I should frame the issue in terms of fearing a potential loss. That's usually a stronger motivation than expecting a potential gain. For example, I wouldn't suggest to a coach that he could improve his chances of winning by going for it on 4th down more often. Instead, I'd tell him he's forfeiting a significant chance of winning by not going for it. Nobody likes forfeiting stuff. My wife suggested using the phrase "leaving points on the table." Coach Wisenhunt forfeited 13% chance of winning that game.
By far, the most common question I get from reporters is whether teams are going for it more often. My answer is almost always "it's complicated, but I think so." The difficulty in measuring 4th down aggressiveness is that it's so dependent on the situational variables. You can't just count how often teams go for it rather than kicking. To-go distance, score, and time all weigh heavily on the decisions, and there are just too many possible combinations to compare rates from year to year or even decade to decade.
If we constrain the analysis to certain parameters--inside opponent territory and when the score difference is within reason, for example--we'd get an incomplete picture. We've learned over the last few years that there can be many situations outside traditional 'go-for-it' limits in which it can be beneficial to go for the conversion rather than kick or punt. And each situation can have a drastically different magnitude of effect on a team's chances of winning. Also, why would we reward a coach if he goes for it on 4th and whatever when he's down by 5 with a minute left to play? Coaches always do that.
Here's my stab at the problem. With every 4th down situation in which it would usually make sense to go for it but a coach decides to kick, he forfeits some amount of win probability. We can total all the WP forfeited to measure the degree to which teams are erring on the side of conservatism.
More Falcons' 4th-Down Decisions
Earlier this year, the Falcons were criticized for going for it on 4th down and failing to convert against the Saints in OT. Mike Smith was crucified for his "incorrect" decision. But, as Brian wrote, his decision was correct. A decision cannot be evaluated based on the outcome, but rather the theoretical expectation of the choice itself. This week against the Giants, Mike Smith was faced with several 4th-down decision throughout the course of the game. The first came at the end of a 14-play, 66-yard drive at the start of the 2nd quarter. Using our Markov model, we can look at how the drive developed:
Chiefs' Conflicting 4th Down Decisions
In this tumultuous Week 15, we saw the winless Colts beat the Titans, the seemingly unstoppable Packers lose to a floundering Chiefs team, and his holiness, Tim Tebow, lose for the first time in 7 games. Kansas City jumped out to a 6-0 lead with two early field goals, but just as importantly, kept the ball out of Aaron Rodgers' hands by sustaining long drives. The Chiefs' first three drives totaled 38 plays consuming over 19 minutes of game clock. Newly anointed interim head coach Romeo Crennel was also faced with a few early 4th-down decisions. Using our Markov model, we can see how these drives developed.
The Chiefs received the opening kickoff and proceeded to drive 79 yards on 14 plays, not letting the Packers offense take the field until six minutes had already run off the clock. Here is a look at how the probabilities developed throughout the drive:
How to Talk to a Skeptic about Risky 4th Downs
I'm not sure I buy your numbers. Where do they come from anyway?
The win probability (WP) numbers are from actual teams playing actual games. They’re average win rates based on recent NFL history. They are not theoretical or simulated outcomes. They’re simply how often teams win given certain situations. In many cases where there are too few games for a reliable estimate, other similar situations are used to smooth the gaps. There are some sophisticated statistical tools that help make sure we do that right, but underneath it all are actual games and actual wins and losses.
Football is a game of momentum. If a team goes for it and fails, it will lose all its momentum and its players will be deflated.
Momentum in sports, for the most part, is an illusion. People naturally expect to see events alternate more often that they really do. Streaky outcomes are a natural part of the world, and momentum is not needed to explain it. Flip a coin a few times and you’ll see that there are streaks of the same result, and no one would ever say the coin had momentum.
Here’s a quarter. Go ahead and start flipping now. I’ll wait. Half out of every set of two flips will be the same two results in a row. One in four sets of three flips will be a streak of the same result…And one out of eight times you’ll see four straight of the same result. There are at least 20 drives in an NFL game, plenty of opportunity to witness perfectly natural streaks.
Despite this illusion, emotion can be an important part of a sport like football. No one can deny that. And I agree that large successes and failures are an important part of players’ emotional states. But the momentum/emotion argument always assumes failure. It assumes momentum/emotion can only be lost. It can be gained too, perhaps from a 4th down conversion. Besides, what happens to your opponent’s emotional state when your team successfully converts a 4th down?
But that offense was only 1 for 3 in converting short yardage situations in the game. No way the chance of conversion was close to 75%. More like 33%!
The Secret to the Falcons' Success?
The Wall Street Journal's Michael Saffino wrote an article last week about the Falcons' aggressive tendencies on fourth down this season. In opponent territory, with 3 yards or less to go and more than 4 minutes remaining, the Falcons went for the conversion on 72% of their opportunities, the most in the league. They converted on 85% of those attempts. The review of the game's play-by-play indicated that Atlanta would have scored 21 points according to league-average field goal rates, but following their successful conversions the Falcons actually went on to score 51 points--a net of 30 additional points. And in 3 games, the points scored off of 4th down conversions made the difference in the win. Could this be the explanation for the Falcons' dramatic over-performance this season?
In this post, I'll attempt a few things. First, I'll discuss how we should properly measure the impact of 4th down decisions and measure the wisdom of the decisions themselves. Then I'll look specifically at the Falcons' 4th down situations and measure their impact on Atlanta's fortunes in terms of EPA and WPA. Lastly, I'll look at how all the teams did in terms of 4th down decisions.
Navy 4th Down Strategy
Navy plays a triple option offense, a somewhat rare scheme even in college these days. The triple option allows Navy to compete against much bigger and faster opponents using discipline and execution as their weapons. They tend to be at or near the top of all Division I (FBS) schools in running every year, partly because they rarely pass and partly because they run the option so well.
Navy has enjoyed tremendous success in recent years, especially for a school that offers its recruits a rigorous and austere lifestyle, an extremely challenging curriculum, and virtually no chance of an NFL career. Last year they won 10 games, including their second win over Notre Dame in three years and a 35-13 drubbing of Missouri in the Texas Bowl. It was their seventh consecutive winning season and seventh consecutive bowl appearance. QB Ricky Dobbs broke Tim Tebow's record for rushing TDs by a QB last season. As my favorite Navy blog put it, archrival Army looked at their two-touchdown loss to the Midshipmen last year as a cause for optimism.
One thing about option football is that there is always a very good chance of a gain of at least a few yards. There aren't sacks or incomplete pass attempts. Navy always seems to be able to gain at least 2 or 3 yards when they need to, even when the defense knows exactly what is coming.
4th Down Briefs
About a year ago I made a powerpoint about when teams should go for it on 4th down. The goal was to have something other than a 4-part blog post or a scholarly research paper that could be used to convince the doubters out there. I never published it because I was never really thrilled with it. I wanted to keep it as short as possible, knowing most people generally don't have lots of time to devote to abstract notions of "Expected Points" in the NFL. The result was an unfortunate eye chart of bullets, sub-bullets, and graphs.
I think it's salvageable with some work, at least as a presentation for a willing audience. But I decided to start over with something much simpler, designed for the uninitiated on the topic. I got the powerpoint religion and abandoned my bullet-ridden format for something I hope is more compelling and more entertaining. My hope is that it's more accessible, and it gets emailed and twittered around a little.
Here is the revised version:
And this was the original which goes into another level of detail:
Andy Reid Is No Longer My Hero
Note: This post was taken from a series of comments on the recent Games of Week post. Thanks to all who contributed to the discussion.
About a month ago Eagles head coach Andy Reid was my hero of the week for his daring, and smart, onside kick to open the game against the Redskins. Although it failed and gave up 7 points, he got them back by going for it on 4th down inside field goal range, succeeding, and getting the touchdown.
This past week, however, Reid is again the goat. With 3 minutes left in a tie game against the Broncos, the Eagles faced a 4th and 1 from their own 49. The Eagles punted. This was a big mistake, and you don't even need fancy math or some win probability model to prove it. Worse, Reid made the exact same call a year ago in the infamous tie against the Bengals.
If you have a 4th and 1 at about the 50 and you go for it, the value of the two possible outcomes are exactly equal. In other words, either I have a 1st down at the 50, or my opponent has a 1st down at the 50. It's perfectly symmetrical. Now consider what punting means.
Desperation Graphed
[Note: I can't remember if I already posted this or not. I did this back over the summer and saved it for the season. But I don't think I ever clicked 'publish.' ]
How desperate do NFL coaches have to be before they start going for it on 4th down?
Recently I've shown that, as a rule, teams should be going for it on 4th down far more often than they currently do. But what is 'currently do?' How far do coaches let themselves get backed up against the wall before they start actually doing what's best for their chances of winning?
Are Teams Going For It More In 2009?
Is it me, or do I sense that teams are going for it more often on 4th down this year? And maybe I'm imagining things, but I also get the feeling that teams have been even more daring since the Belichick 4th down decision against the Colts.
The three graphs below tell the story. The top two graphs depict the proportion of 4th down decisions by field position. The first graph is for the 2000-2008 seasons, and the second is for the 2009 season. The third graph isolates just the proportion of conversion attempts by field position so we can better compare the previous seasons with the current season.
Last Thoughts on the 4th and 2
At the risk of being accused of milking this thing, here are some final few thoughts on the topic. I watched the Football Night in America segment and a few things struck me.
Let me say I have a lot of respect for Coach Dungy. I also think that convincing someone skeptical is difficult, and we shouldn't expect someone to immediately come around. In general though, coaches (and former players/analysts) benefit from a perception that football is some unknowable mystery, and that they are the only priests that can divine the true answers.
From Dungy's perspective, he's enjoyed long career by doing it the conventional way. But the reason his way worked was because everyone else played the same way. To change his mind now might mean admitting, "I did it wrong all these years." That's a tough hurdle to overcome.
Belichick 4th Down Follow-Up
Thanks to the commenters on the original post, all 200+ of you, for all the great criticisms and suggestions. The Internet is a big place, and although not every comment was helpful, I was pleased to see such a thoughtful and constructive debate. In this follow-up, I'll try to address some of the most common criticisms and questions. I suspect some skeptics will never be fully satisfied, but I feel many of the comments deserve a response.
1. You used 38 yds for the expected punt distance, the average punt distance for that region of the field. But Patriots punter Chris Hansen had averaged 4 punts for 44 yds. Why not use that distance instead?
Kevin Kelley of Pulaski Academy
A reader posted this link in a recent comment. It's an interview with Kevin Kelley, head coach of the Pulaski Academy high school football team in Little Rock, Arkansas. He always goes for it on 4th down and 75% of his kick offs are onside kicks. The team has enjoyed unprecedented success, including winning the state championship last year. I've mentioned him before, but he spells out his thinking very clearly here. Gregg Easterbrook has been writing about Coach Kelley and Pulaski Academy since 2007. He was also featured in a Sports Illustrated article earlier this season.
The video is embedded below, but you may need to give the video a few seconds to load. Here is the direct link.
Irrational Play Calling
As if you need any more evidence of how irrational many coaches can be when facing a 4th down, here’s some more.
In ‘no man’s land,’ the region of the field from the opponent’s 30-35 yd line, punts don’t buy you much and field goals are just above 50/50 propositions. Going for the conversion occurs fairly frequently, particularly on 4th and short. This is the confluence of 4th down decision making where all 3 options are reasonable choices.
But once a coach has decided that going for it is not worth the risk, he can then choose between attempting a FG and punting. Neither of these options is affected in any way by distance to go. Only field position matters. A field goal is just as rewarding and just as risky on 4th and 1 from the 30 as it would be on 4th and 15 from the 30. Same goes for punts. Distance to go should only affect conversion attempts. It would be irrational to base a decision between a FG and punt based on something that only matters when attempting a conversion. But that doesn’t stop NFL coaches from doing exactly that, a fact first noticed by commenter 'Jim A' last season.
Marvin Lewis Gets Bold In Overtime
The Wall Street Journal's 'Numbers Guy' Carl Bialik asked me the other night about the Bengals' 4th and 11 conversion attempt late in overtime against the Browns. With a just over a minute left in OT, the Bengals faced a 4th and 11 from the Cleveland 41. Quarterback Carson Palmer was able to scramble for 15 yards and a first down, and Cincinnati went on to kick a field goal to pull out the win. At the risk of sounding like a broken record on the topic of 4th down decisions, here's a summary of what I told Carl.
Jim Zorn on 4th Down
Zorn is my hero today. On the Redskins’ final drive of their game against the Rams yesterday, head coach Jim Zorn went for it on 4th down not once, but twice. The network commentators were shocked, and the local media coverage has been decidedly critical. Were they good decisions?
The first decision “felt” right to me. Up by 2 points with 3:47 left in the 4th quarter, Washington faced a 4th and 1 at St. Louis’ 20 yd line. A FG attempt from there is an 84% proposition. A kickoff with a 5-point lead gives the Redskins a 0.76 Win Probability (WP). A missed FG attempt gives the ball to the Rams at the 27 and leaves the Redskins with a 0.56 WP. The net WP for the FG attempt is:
The 4th Down Study - Part 4
The is the fourth and final part of my article on 4th down decisions. In the first part, I reviewed the concept of Expected Points and the concept of expected utility. The second part detailed the kicking game and its expected values. The third part explored the value of 4th down conversion attempts. This, the final part of the article puts all the concepts together. I also discuss some of the explanations for why coaches are so reluctant to go for it when they should.
The 4th Down Study - Part 3
The is the third part of a four-part article on 4th down decisions. In the first part, I reviewed the concept of Expected Points and the concept of expected utility. The second part detailed the kicking game and its expected values. This, the third part explores the value of 4th down conversion attempts. The final part of the article will put all the concepts together. Ultimately, I'll conclude with a chart of recommended decisions for 4th downs at every combination of field position and distance to go.
The 4th Down Study - Part 2
The is the second part of a four-part article on 4th down decisions. In the first part, I reviewed the concept of Expected Points and the concept of expected utility. This part of the article, details the kicking game. The third part will explore the value of 4th down conversion attempts. The final part of the article will put all the concepts together to ultimately produce a chart of recommended decisions for 4th downs at every combination of field position and distance to go.